Abstract. The Paradox of the Ravens (a.k.a,, The Paradox of Confirmation) is indeed an old chestnut. A great many things have been written and said about this paradox and its implications for the logic of evidential support.
The Original Formulation of the Paradox
Traditionally, the Paradox of the Ravens is generated by the following two assumptions (or premises). argument for (PC). Since Quine also accepts the (classical) equivalence condition (EC), he must accept premise (2) . Thus, he is led, inevitably, to the rejection of premise (1) . This means he must reject (NC) -and he does so. Indeed, according to Quine, not only does (∼Ba · ∼Ra) fail to confirm (∀x)(∼Bx ⊃ ∼Rx), but also ∼Ra fails to confirm (∀x) ∼Rx. According to Quine, the failure of instantial confirmation in these cases stems from the fact that the predicates 'nonblack' [∼B] and 'non-raven' [∼R] are not natural kinds -i.e., the objects falling under ∼B and ∼R are not sufficiently similar to warrant instantial confirmation of universal laws involving ∼B or ∼R. Only instances falling under natural kinds can warrant instantial confirmation of universal laws. Thus, for Quine, (NC) is the source of the problem here. He suggests that the unrestricted version (NC) is false, and must be replaced by a restricted version that applies only to natural kinds:
Quine-Nicod Condition (QNC): For any object a and any natural kinds F and G, the proposition that a has both F and G confirms the proposition that every F has G. More formally, (Fa · Ga) confirms (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Gx), for any individual term a, provided that the predicates 'F' and 'G' refer to natural kinds.
To summarize, Quine thinks (PC) is false, and that the (valid) canonical argument for (PC) is unsound because (NC) is false. Furthermore, according to Quine, once (NC) is restricted in scope to natural kinds, the resulting restricted instantial confirmation principle (QNC) is true, but useless for deducing (PC) . 3 However, many other commentators have taken (NC) to be the real 3 Interestingly, while Hempel and Goodman are completely unsympathetic to Quine's strategy here, they are much more sympathetic to such maneuvers in the context of the Grue Paradox. In this sense, Quine's approach to the paradoxes is more unified and systematic than Hempel's or culprit here, as we'll soon see. We think that the real problems with (NC) [and (QNC)!] only become clear when the paradox is cast in more precise Bayesian terms, in a way that will be explicated in the second part of this paper. But we will first show how the Bayesian framework allows us to clarify the paradox and the historical debates surrounding it.
Bayesian Clarifications of (NC) and (PC)
Hempel (1945) provided a cautionary remark about the paradox. He warned us not to conflate the paradoxical conclusion (PC) with a distinct (intuitively) false conclusion (PC*) that (intuitively) does not follow from (NC) and (EC). We think Hempel's intuitive contrast between (PC) and (PC*) is important for a proper understanding the paradox. So, we'll discuss it briefly.
What, precisely, was the content of this (PC*)? Well, that turns out to be a bit difficult to say from the perspective of traditional, deductive accounts of confirmation. Based on the rest of Hempel's discussion and the penetrating recent exegesis of Patrick Maher (Maher 1999) , we think the most accurate informal way to characterize (PC*) is as follows:
(PC*) If one observes that an object a -already known to be a non-raven -is non-black (hence, is a non-black non-raven), then this observation confirms that all ravens are black.
Goodman's, since they give "special treatment" to Grue-predicates, while Quine views the problem -in both paradoxes of confirmation -to be rooted in the "non-naturalness" of the referents of the predicates involved. For what it's worth, we think a unified and systematic approach to the paradoxes is to be preferred. But, we think a unified Bayesian approach is preferable to Quine's instantial approach. However, our preferred Bayesian treatment of Grue will have to wait for another paper.
As Maher points out, it is somewhat tempting to conflate (PC*) and (PC). But, Hempel did not believe that (PC*) was true (intuitively) about confirmation, nor did he think that (PC*) (intuitively) follows from (NC) and (EC). This is because, intuitively, observing (known) nonravens does not tell us anything about the color of ravens. While this seems intuitively quite plausible, it is quite difficult to see how Hempel's confirmation theory can theoretically ground the desired distinction between (PC) and (PC*). What Hempel says is that we should not look at the evidence E in conjunction with other information that we might have at our disposal. Rather, we should look at the confirmational impact of learning E and only E.
There are two problems with this (the second worse than the first). First, as we have cast it (and as we think it should be cast), (PC*) is not a claim about the confirmational impact on (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Bx) of learning ∼Ba in conjunction with other information about a (i.e., ∼Ra), but the impact on (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Bx) of learning ∼Ba given that you already know ∼Ra. Basically, we are distinguishing the following two kinds of claims:
• E confirms H, given A -e.g., ∼Ba confirms (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Bx), given ∼Ra -versus
unconditionally.
Note: in classical deductive logic, there is no distinction between:
• X entails Y, given Z, and
For this reason, Hempel's theory of confirmation (which is based on deductive entailmentsee below) is incapable of making such a distinction. Perhaps this explains why he states things in terms of conjunction, rather than conditionalization. After all, he offers no confirmationtheoretical distinction between 'and' and 'given that'. So, while it seems that there is an intuitive distinction of the desired kind between (PC) and (PC*), it is unclear how Hempel's theory is supposed to make this distinction formally precise [see Maher (1999) for discussion].
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The second problem with Hempel's intuitive "explaining away" of the paradox is far more confirmation -where hereafter, we will use the words "confirms" and "confirmation" in accordance with this Bayesian account:
• Bayesian Confirmation. E confirms H, given K (or relative to K), just in case
And, E confirms H, unconditionally, just in case
is some suitable probability function.
7
It is easy to see, on this account of (conditional and unconditional) confirmation, that there will be a natural distinction between (PC) and (PC*). From a Bayesian point of view this distinction becomes:
, and
What Hempel had in mind (charitably) is the former, not the latter. This is crucial for understanding the ensuing historical dialectic regarding the paradox. The important point here is that Bayesian confirmation theory has the theoretical resources to distinguish conditional and 7 We won't bother to discuss the competing axiomatizations and interpretations of probability.
These details won't matter for our discussion. For simplicity we will just assume that P is some rational credence function, and that it satisfies an appropriate version of the standard, (Kolmogorov 1956 ) axioms. But these assumptions could be altered in various ways without affecting the main points we will make below.
unconditional confirmation, but traditional (classical) deductive accounts do not. As a result
Bayesian theory allows us to precisely articulate Hempel's intuition concerning why people might (falsely) believe that the paradoxical conclusion (PC) is false by conflating it with (PC*).
A key insight of Bayesian confirmation theory is that it represents confirmation as a threeplace relation between evidence E, hypothesis H, and background corpus K. From this perspective the traditional formulation of the paradox is imprecise in an important respect: it leaves unclear which background corpus is presupposed in the (NC) -and, as a result, also in the (PC). In other words, there is a missing quantifier in the traditional formulations of (NC) and (PC). Here are four possible precisifications of (NC) [the corresponding precisifications of (PC)
should be obvious]:
• (NC w ) For any individual term 'a' and any pair of predicates 'F' and 'G', there is some
• (NC α ) Relative to our actual background corpus K α, for any individual term 'a' and any pair of predicates 'F' and 'G', (Fa · Ga) confirms (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Gx), given K α .
• (NC T ) Relative to tautological (or a priori) background corpus K T , for any individual term 'a' and any pair of predicates 'F' and 'G', (Fa · Ga) confirms (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Gx), given
• (NC s ) Relative to any possible background corpus K, for any individual term 'a' and any pair of predicates 'F' and 'G', (Fa · Ga) confirms (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Gx), given K.
Which rendition of (NC) is the one Hempel and Goodman had in mind? Well, (NC w ) seems too weak to be of much use. There is bound to be some corpus with respect to which non-black non-ravens confirm 'All non-black things are non-ravens', but this corpus may not be very interesting (e.g., the corpus which contains '(∼Ba · ∼Ra) ⊃ (∀x)(∼Bx ⊃ ∼Rx)'!). What about (NC T )? As Maher (1999) skillfully explains, Hempel and Goodman (and Quine) have something much closer to (NC T ) in mind. Originally, the question was whether learning only (∼Ba · ∼Ra) and nothing else confirms that all ravens are black. And, it seems natural to understand this in terms of confirmation relative to "tautological (or a priori) background". We will return to the notion of "tautological confirmation", and the (NC α ) vs (NC T ) controversy, below. But, first, it is useful to discuss I.J. Good's knock-down counterexample to (NC s ), and his later (rather lame) attempt to formulate a counterexample to (NC T ).
I.J. Good's Counterexample to (NC s ) and his "Counterexample" to (NC T )
Good (1967) asks us to consider the following example (we're paraphrasing here):
• Our background corpus K says that exactly one of the following hypotheses is true: (H) there are 100 black ravens, no non-black ravens, and 1 million other birds, or else (∼H)
there are 1,000 black ravens, 1 white raven, and 1 million other birds. And K also states that an object a is selected at random from all the birds. Given this background K,
Hence, Good has described a background corpus K relative to which (Ra · Ba) disconfirms (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Bx). This is sufficient to show that (NC s ) is false. Hempel (1967) responded to Good by claiming that (NC s ) is not what he had in mind, since it smuggles too much "unkosher" (a posteriori) empirical knowledge into K. Hempel's challenge to Good was (again, charitably) to find a counterexample to (NC T ). Good (1968) 
responded to
Hempel's challenge with the following much less conclusive (rather lame, we think)
…imagine an infinitely intelligent newborn baby having built-in neural circuits enabling him to deal with formal logic, English syntax, and subjective probability. He might now argue, after defining a [raven] in detail, that it is initially extremely unlikely that there are any [ravens] , and therefore that it is extremely likely that all [ravens] are black. … On the other hand, if there are [ravens], then there is a reasonable chance that they are a variety of colours. Therefore, if I were to discover that even a black [raven] exists I would consider [(∀x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)] to be less probable than it was initially.
Needless to say, this "counterexample" to (NC T ) is far from conclusive! To us it seems completely unconvincing [see Maher (1999) for a trenchant analysis of this example]. The problem here is that in order to give a rigorous and compelling counterexample to (NC T ), one needs a theory of "tautological confirmation" -i.e. of "confirmation relative to tautological background". Good doesn't have such a theory (nor do most contemporary probabilists), which explains the lack of rigor and persuasiveness of "Good's Baby". However, Patrick Maher does have such an account; and he has applied it in his recent, neo-Carnapian, Bayesian analysis of the paradox of the ravens. Carnap (1950 Carnap ( , 1952 Carnap ( , 1971 Carnap ( , 1980 proposed various theories of "tautological confirmation" in terms of "logical probability". Recently Patrick Maher (1999 Maher ( , 2004 has brought a Carnapian approach to bear on the ravens paradox, with some very enlightening results. For our purposes it is useful to emphasize two consequences of Maher's neo-Carnapian, Bayesian analysis of the paradox. First, Maher shows that (PC*) is false on a neo-Carnapian theory of (Bayesian) confirmation. That is, if we take a suitable class of Carnapian probability functions P c (• | •) -e.g., either those of Maher (1999) or Maher (2004) -as our "probabilities relative to tautological background", then we get the following result [see Maher (1999) ]
Maher's Neo-Carnapian Analysis of the Ravens Paradox
Intuitively, this says that observing the color of (known) non-ravens tells us nothing about the color of ravens, relative to tautological background corpus. This is a theoretical vindication of Hempel's intuitive claim that (PC*) is false -a vindication that is at best difficult to make out in Hempel's deductive theory of confirmation. But, all is not beer and skittles for Hempel. is false, and so is its Quinean "restriction" (QNC T ). That is, Maher (2004) shows that probabilistic approaches to confirmation are much richer and more powerful than traditional, deductive approaches. And, we think, Maher's work finally answers Hempel's challenge to Good -a challenge that went unanswered for nearly forty years.
Moreover, Maher's results also suggest that Quine's analysis in "Natural Kinds" was off the mark. Contrary to what Quine suggests, the problem with (NC) is not merely that it needs to be restricted in scope to certain kinds of properties. The problems with (NC) run much deeper than that. Even the most promising Hempelian precisification of (NC) is false, and a restriction to "natural kinds" does not help (since Maher-style, neo-Carnapian counterexamples can be generated that employ only to "natural kinds" in Quine's sense). Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, almost all contemporary Bayesians implicitly assume that the paradoxical conclusion is true. And, they aim only to "soften the impact" of (PC) by trying to establish certain comparative and/or quantitative confirmational claims. Specifically, Bayesians typically aim to show (at least) that the observation of a black raven, (Ba · Ra), confirms that all ravens are black more strongly than the observation of a non-black non-raven, (∼Ba · ∼Ra) does, relative to our actual background corpus K α , which is assumed to contain no "unkosher" information about a. Specifically, most contemporary Bayesians aim to show (at least) that relative to some measure c of how strongly evidence supports a hypothesis, the following COMParative claim holds:
9 As Chihara (1981) points out, "there is no such thing as the Bayesian solution. There are many different 'solutions' that Bayesians have put forward using Bayesian techniques". That said, we present here what we take to be the most standard assumptions Bayesians tend to make in their handling of the paradox -assumptions that are sufficient for the desired comparative and quantitative confirmation-theoretic claims. On this score, we follow Vranas (2004) . However, not all Bayesians make precisely these assumptions. To get a sense of the variety of Bayesian approaches, see, e.g.: (Alexander 1958) ; (Chihara 1981) ; (Earman 1992) ; (Eells 1982) ; (Gaifman 1979) ; (Gibson 1969) ; (Good 1960 (Good , 1961 ; (Hesse 1974) ; (Hooker & Stove 1968) ; (Horwich 1982) , ; (Howson & Urbach 1993) ; (Jardine 1965) ; (Mackie 1963) ; (Nerlich 1964) ; (Suppes 1966) ; (Swinburne 1971 (Swinburne , 1973 ; (Wilson 1964) ; (Woodward 1985) ; (Hintikka 1969) ; (Humburg 1986 ); (Maher 1999 (Maher , 2004 ; (Vranas 2004) .
Here c(H, E | K) is some Bayesian measure of the degree to which E confirms H, relative to background corpus K. The typical Bayesian strategy is to isolate constraints on K α that are as minimal as possible (hopefully, even ones that Hempel would see as kosher), so as to guarantee that (COMP c ) obtains.
As it stands, (COMP c ) is somewhat unclear. There are many Bayesian relevance measures c that have been proposed and defended in the contemporary literature on Bayesian confirmation.
The four most popular of these measures are the following [see Fitelson (1999) 
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The Difference:
The Normalized Difference:
Measures d, r, and l all satisfy the following desideratum, for all H, E 1 , E 2 , and K:
But, interestingly, measure s does not satisfy ( †). So, if one uses either d, r, or l to measure confirmation, then one can establish the desired comparative claim simply by demonstrating that:
10 We take logarithms of the ratio measures just to ensure that they are positive in cases of confirmation, negative in cases of disconfirmation, and zero in cases of neutrality of irrelevance. This is a useful convention for present purposes, but since logs don't alter the ordinal structure of the measures, it is a mere convention.
(If one uses s, then one has a bit more work to do to establish the desired comparative conclusion, because (COMP P ) does not entail (COMP s ).) 11 Some Bayesians go farther than this by trying to establish not only the comparative claim (COMPc), but also the quantitative claim that the observation of a non-black non-raven confirms that "All ravens are black" to a "minute" degree. That is, in addition to the comparative claim, some Bayesians also go for the following QUANTative claim:
Let's begin by discussing the canonical contemporary Bayesian comparative analysis of the paradox. In essence, almost all such accounts trade on the following three assumptions about
where it is assumed that the object a is sampled at random from the universe:
12 11 This has led some defenders of s to abandon it as a measure of incremental confirmation. See Joyce (2004, fn. 11) . See, also, Eells and Fitelson (2000, 2002) and Fitelson (2001) for further peculiarities of the measure s.
12 Often, Bayesians use a two-stage sampling model in which two objects a and b are sampled at random from the universe, where K α entails (Ra · ~Bb) [e.g., Earman (1992) ]. On that model we still have (2), but (3) is replaced with
, and (COMP P ) is replaced by
So, no real loss of generality comes from restricting our treatment to "one-stage sampling" -i.e., to the selection of a single object a, which K α doesn't specify to be either an R or a ~B (Vranas 2004, fns. 10 and 18) . We prefer a one-stage sampling approach because we think it is closer in spirit to what Hempel and
Goodman took the original paradox to be about -where K α is assumed not to have any
Basically, assumption (1) relies on our knowledge that (according to K α ) there are more nonblack objects in the universe than there are ravens. This seems like a very plausible distributional constraint on K α , since -as far as we actually know -it is true. Assumptions (2) and (3) are more controversial. We will say more about them shortly. First, we note an important and pretty wellknown theorem.
THEOREM. (1)- (3) In fact, (1)- (3) entails much more than (COMP P ), as the following theorem illustrates:
THEOREM.
(1)-(3) also entail the following:
In other words, (4) tells us that assumptions (1)- (3) entail that the observation of a non-black non-raven confirms that all ravens are black -i.e., that the paradoxical conclusion (PC) is true.
And, (5) tells us that even according to s [a measure that violates ( †)] the observation of a black
raven confirms that all ravens are black more strongly than the observation of a non-black nonravens does.
implications about the color or species of the objects sampled, and where a single object is observed "simultaneously" for its color and species.
The fact that (1)- (3) entail (4) and (5) Various Bayesians go farther than (COMP c ) in their analysis of the ravens paradox. They seek to identify (stronger) constraints, stronger background knowledge K α , that entails both (COMP c ) and (QUANT c ). The most common strategy along these lines is simply to strengthen (1), as follows:
, there are far fewer ravens than non-black things in the universe.
Peter Vranas (2004) provides a very detailed discussion of quantitative Bayesian approaches to the ravens paradox along these lines. We won't dwell too much on the details of these approaches. Vranas does an excellent job of analyzing them. However, some brief remarks on a result Vranas proves and uses in his analysis are worth considering here.
Vranas shows that assumptions (1′) and (3) (without (2)) are sufficient for (QUANT c ) to hold (i.e. for (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Bx) to be positively confirmed by (~Ba · ~Ra), given K α , but only by a very small amount) for all four measures of confirmation d, r, l, and s. Moreover, he argues that in the presence of (1′) , (3) is "approximately necessary" for (QUANT c ). What he proves is that, given for (QUANT c ):
Vranas then argues that Bayesians have given no good reason for this necessary (and sufficient) condition. Thus, he concludes, Bayesian resolutions of the paradox that claim non-black nonravens confirm by a tiny bit, due to assumption (1' ), have failed to establish a condition they must employ to establish this claim -they have failed to establish (3' ). 13 Vranas' claim that (3) is "approximately necessary" for (QUANT c ) may be somewhat misleading. It makes it sound as if (3) has a certain property. But, in fact, nothing about (3) itself follows from Vranas' results. It is more accurate to say (as Bob Dylan might) that "approximately (3)" [i.e., (3′)] is necessary for (QUANT c ). To see the point, note that (3) is a rather strong independence assumption, which entails many other identities, including:
13 However, Vranas does not argue that (3′) is false or implausible -only that no good argument for its plausibility has been given. So, it is consistent with his result that one might be able to find some plausible condition X that, together with (1′), implies (QUANT c ). Vranas' result would then show that condition X (together with (1′)) also implies (3′) -and so in effect would provide a plausibility argument for (3′). Some of the results we prove in the next two section provide such plausible conditions, X.
But, (3′) is not an independence assumption. Indeed, (3′) is far weaker than an independence assumption, and it does not entail the parallel approximates:
Vranas argues convincingly that strong independence assumptions like (3) [and (2) 
A New Bayesian Approach to the Paradox
In the comparative case, the primary aim is to establish (COMP P ). As we have seen,
Bayesians typically make two quite strong independence assumptions in order to achieve this goal. Happily, a perfectly satisfactory analysis of the ravens may be given that employs no independence assumptions at all.
In this section of the paper we offer a solution to the raven paradox that is more general than other solutions we know of. It draws on much weaker assumptions. It solves the paradox in that it supplies quite plausible necessary and sufficient conditions for an instance of a black raven to favor 'All ravens are black' more than an instance of a non-black non-raven would favor it.
These conditions do not draw on probabilistic independence. And they in no way depend on whether Nicod's Condition (NC) is satisfied. Our conditions can be satisfied both in cases were an instance raises the degree of confirmation for 'All ravens are black' and in cases where an instance disconfirms the hypothesis.
Let 'H' abbreviate 'All ravens are black' − i.e., '(∀x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)'. Let 'K' be a statement of whatever background knowledge you may think relevant -e.g. K might imply, among other things, that ravens exist and that non-black things exist, ((∃x)Rx · (∃x)~Bx). One object, call it 'a' will be observed for color and to see whether it is a raven. The idea is to assess, in advance of observing it, whether a's turning out to be a black raven, (Ra·Ba), would make H more strongly supported than would a's turning out to be a non-black non-raven, (~Ra·~Ba 
That is, we assume that finding a to be a black raven neither absolutely proves nor absolutely falsifies 'All ravens are black'; and the same goes if a is found to be a non-black non-raven. In addition we assume that it is at least possible, given only background K, that a will turn out to be a non-black raven.
Our analysis of the ravens will draw on three factors, which we label 'p', 'q', and 'r'. Given Non-triviality, p, q, and r are well defined (q and r have non-zero denominators); q and r are greater than 0; and p is greater than 0 and less than 1. (See Lemma 1 in the Appendix.)
The factor r represents how much more likely it is that a will be a non-black thing than be a raven if the world in fact contains only black ravens (i.e. if H is true). Given the kind of world we think we live in, r should be quite large, since even if all of the ravens are black, the non-black things far outnumber the ravens. Similarly, the factor q represents how much more likely it is that a will be a non-black thing than be a raven if the world in fact contains non-black ravens (i.e.
if H is false). Given the kind of world we think we live in, q should also be quite large, since the non-black things far outnumber the ravens even if some of the non-black things happen to be ravens. In any case, though it is plausible that r and q are very large, for now we are not
, it follows that we will not be requiring that H receive positive support from (Ba·Ra). (See Claim 2 in the Appendix for more about this.) assuming that they are large, or anything else about their values, except what is implied by the Non-triviality Assumptions -i.e. that r and q are well-defined and greater than 0.
Suppose that H is in fact false -i.e. non-black ravens exist -and suppose that a is a raven.
How likely is it that a will turn out to be black? The factor p represents this likelihood. This factor may be thought of as effectively representing a "mixture" of the likelihoods due to the various possible alternative hypotheses about the frequency of black birds among the ravens.
Plausibly the value of p is fairly close to 1 -if there are non-black ravens, their proportion among all ravens is plausibly some small percentage; so the proportion of black birds among ravens is plausibly a small increment below 1. However, for now we are not assuming this, or anything else about the value of p, except what is implied by the Non-triviality Assumptionsi.e. that 0 < p < 1.
It turns out that the relative sizes of the likelihood ratios -the ratios that characterize how an instance of a black raven compares with an instance of a non-black non-raven in support of 'All ravens are black' -is merely a function of p, q, and r.
Theorem 1:
Given Non-triviality, q > (1−p) ≥ 0 and
(This and the other theorems are proved in the Appendix.)
This theorem does not itself express the necessary and sufficient conditions for black ravens to favor 'All ravens are black' more strongly than do non-black non-ravens. But an obvious Corollary does so.
Corollary 1:
Given Non-triviality,
And, more generally, for any real number s,
This gives us a fairly useful handle on what it takes for a black raven to support H more than a non-black non-raven. For instance, suppose that q = r. Then the corollary implies that the value of the ratio of likelihood ratios is greater than 1 just in case q = r > 1. 16 Thus, if the likelihood that an object is non-black is greater than the likelihood that it's a raven, and is greater by the same amount regardless of whether or not every raven is black, then a black raven supports 'All ravens are black' more strongly than a non-black non-raven. What if q ≠ r? No problem! Theorem 1 tell us that q > (1−p), so q − (1−p) is just a bit smaller than q itself. And as long as this small diminution of q remains larger than r, the corollary tells us that the likelihood ratio for a black raven favors H more than the likelihood ratio for a non-black 16 Since for q = r, s > 1 iff q − (1−p) > p·q iff q − p·q > (1−p) iff q > 1.
non-raven favors it. Indeed this small diminution of q need only remain larger than a fraction p of r in order to yield the desired result.
It turns out that 1/p is a convenient benchmark for the relative sizes of the likelihood ratios.
The following Corollary tells us how the size of the ratio of likelihood ratios is related to 1/p.
Corollary 2:
Given Non-triviality, for real number s such that Let's look at one more theorem that solves the paradox in an intuitively plausible way. This result is less general than Theorem 1, but closely related to it. 
Although this theorem is not as general as Theorem 1 and its corollaries, it employs intuitively plausible, but quite weak suppositions regarding the ravens. To understand the theorem, let's first consider Supposition (2) . Think of it this way. It is reasonable to suppose, given plausible background knowledge, that the non-black things will be much more numerous than ravens, regardless of whether all the ravens are black. But perhaps this intuition is too strong. Perhaps our intuitions are prejudiced by the fact that we inhabit a world in which there are clearly more non-black things than ravens. Problem is, if our world is one in which all the ravens are black, we may only be warranted in supposing that the non-black things outnumber the ravens in worlds like our − i.e. where all the ravens are black. If, on the other hand, ours happens to be a world in which there really are non-black ravens, then we may only be warranted in supposing that the non-black things outnumber the ravens in worlds like ours − i.e. where there are non-black ravens. But we don't know which of these two kinds of worlds ours happens to be. That is precisely the hypothesis that is at issue. Nevertheless, we can easily fineness this apparent difficulty. For, the apparent dilemma takes it as granted that either non-black things are much more numerous than ravens if H holds, or non-black things are much more numerous than ravens if ~H holds. Thus, given reasonable background knowledge, for an individual a about which nothing else is known, either
− i.e., either r > 1 or q > 1. Thus, Supposition (2) of the theorem is very weak indeed.
The idea behind Supposition (1) is that the mere fact that a is non-black doesn't, on its own, provide more evidence for 'All ravens are black' than would the mere fact that a is a raven. Suppositions (1) and (2) are both extremely plausible; and they jointly entail that a black raven favors 'All ravens are black' more than would a non-black non-raven. Thus, we believe that this result together with Theorem 1 and its corollaries shows that a careful Bayesian analysis removes the paradox from the case of the ravens.
Quantitative Results
As Vranas shows, traditional quantitative Bayesian approaches make rather strong, independence-like assumptions in order to establish (QUANT c ). We think that quantitative claims like (QUANT c ) only make sense relative to a specific measure of confirmation c. As such, we think one needs to commit to a confirmation measure, before one argues for quantitative confirmation claims. For various reasons [which we won't go into here, see (Fitelson 2001) and (Fitelson 2004) for discussion], we think the best Bayesian measure of confirmation is the (log)
likelihood-ratio measure l. (We'll suppress the "log" here; nothing we say will hang on the way likelihood ratios are re-scaled by taking the log.) 17 An equivalent (and perhaps more illuminating) way of stating supposition (1) is that the ratio
This formulation also makes it easier to see that our (1) is strictly weaker than the two independence assumptions normally used by Bayesians in this context. After all, if independence assumption (2) holds, then the ratio P(Ra | H & K) / P(Ra | K) equals 1, and if the second independence assumption (3) holds, then the ratio
In terms of the likelihood ratios and our factors p, q, and r, a slight reworking of Vranas' result is as follows: necessary condition for a non-black non-raven to provide only a very small amount of support for 'All ravens are black'. Vranas's point is that traditional Bayesian treatments of the raven paradox draw on this equality directly, as an assumption. And since it is a necessary condition for (at most) a very small amount of confirmation by non-black non-ravens, any treatment of the paradox that draws on the "small amount of confirmation" idea must be committed to it. But, Vranas argues, no plausible justification for assuming this (near) equality has yet been given by those who employ it as an assumption.
Notice that none of our results described in the previous section draw on this approximate independence assumption. Indeed, these results don't draw on the supposition that non-black One additional way to motivate this conclusion is as follows. Let us start again from scratch -assuming only non-triviality. If the world is as we usually take it to be, it seems quite plausible to suppose that the world has a certain (unknown) number of ravens, regardless of whether all of them are black. Also, the number of objects in the world from which the instance is drawn Under normal circumstances p may be somewhere around .9 or .95; so (1/p) is somewhere around 10/9 ≈ 1.11 or 100/95 ≈ 1.05. Thus, it may appear that a single instance of a black raven does not yield much more support than would a non-black non-raven. However, under plausible conditions it can be shown that a sequence of n instances (i.e. of n black ravens, as compared to n non-black non-ravens) yields a ratio of likelihood ratios on the order of (1/p) n , which blows up significantly for large n. (E.g., for n = 100 instances, ( Rather, we here introduce it as an add-on, merely to show that small confirmation by non-black non-ravens is consistent with the previous result. Following this idea out one more step: given the assumptions of the previous paragraph together with the added supposition of (at most) small confirmation by non-black non-ravens (i.e., P 
Appendix: Proofs of Results in Section 7.
Here we prove the claims and theorems cited in Section 7.
Claim 1:
Given the Non-trivality Assumptions,
